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Commentary on Hall (2017): Canada, cannabis legalization and uncertainty around the UN drug 
control conventions 
 
Moves in Canada to legalize cannabis for recreational purposes necessitates careful consideration of 
the options available for reconciling domestic policy shifts with international legal commitments 
under the United Nations drug control conventions.  
 
 
Hall makes a timely and valuable contribution to the growing debate and accompanying literature 
concerning the prospects for the United Nations (UN) based international drug control system and 
prohibition-oriented state policies operating beneath it [1].  This commentary seeks to develop some 
aspects of Hall’s discussion of treaty reform, particularly in relation to the options available to the 
government of Canada as it moves to implement legislation legalizing cannabis for recreational use 
in July 2018. 
 
Hall is right to say that the future of the three UN drug control treaties is ‘now uncertain because of 
decisions by Uruguay, eight US states, and Canada to legalize cannabis use.’ It is fair to argue that 
what has usefully been called the global drug prohibition regime [2] built around these multilateral 
conventions is currently in an unparalleled period of uncertainty and crisis [3].  That said, readers 
should not come away with the impression that officials in Montevideo and Washington D.C. have 
chosen simply to disregard the treaties and provisions concerning the prohibition of cannabis for 
anything other than medical and scientific purposes. Rather, both Uruguay and the federal US 
government—albeit from very different premises—have considered carefully how to justify 
domestic policy shifts in light of their international legal commitments [4]. Despite the challenges 
faced, the regime retains remarkable compliance-pull [5]. With Canada currently on track to 
confront the drug treaty questions already being faced by its southern neighbours, it is useful to 
explore some of the choices available to the Trudeau administration.  This is particularly so since the 
country’s position as a G7 and Commonwealth state implementing regulated cannabis markets at a 
national level is likely to set a precedent for any other states considering legalization of the drug for 
recreational purposes.    
 
As Hall discusses, the current dynamics within the multilateral system means that any formal 
revision of the treaties requiring consensus or a majority vote in a UN body is unlikely; certainly for 
the foreseeable future.  However, there appear to be more legally grounded routes to pursue than 
the ‘untidy legal justifications’ [4] put forward by the US and Uruguay.  This is particularly so 
regarding the US argument that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to permit regulated markets for 
the recreational use of cannabis; an approach that is potentially damaging to not only the pursuit of 
rights based drug policy, but also international law more broadly [6, 7, 8, 9].   The flexibility 
argument may seem politically attractive in the short term. Yet, an approach deemed in 
contravention of the treaties by serious legal analysis [10, 11] would appear to be deeply 
problematic for a country like Canada that cherishes its reputation for upholding international law.  
 
Emerging analysis suggests that a range of alternatives merit careful consideration in Ottawa [12,13].  
Beyond simply withdrawing from the drug treaties, these options include the possibility of 
denouncing and then re-acceding with reservations.  This procedure, as Hall points out, was 
successfully used by Bolivia regarding the coca leaf in 2013.  Legal scholarship suggests that 
increased application in a range of international fields might see the mechanism become more 
common for states to ‘unilaterally modify their treaty obligations’ [14], although the unique 
circumstances of the Bolivian case arguably warn against drawing direct parallels.  Another option, 
and one not considered in the article, is modification of certain treaty provisions by means of a 
special agreement among a group of like-minded countries.  Among others, such an ‘inter se’ 
approach would have the benefit of not only providing safety in numbers in the face of certain 
criticism from the status quo oriented members of the regime, but also allow for international trade 
between regulating jurisdictions and the incorporation of traditional cannabis producing countries 
within an emerging legal market.  
 
Clearly, political as well as legal calculations will have to be made.  Nonetheless, despite some 
alarmist commentaries concerning the need for Canada to withdraw from the conventions before 
implementing its domestic legislation [15, 16, 17], it seems that a sensible approach should involve 
unhurried reflection on all the options and decision-making that considers events elsewhere.  The 
Canadian policy shift is not, after all, taking place within a vacuum.  As well as substantive discussion 
of cannabis legalization in other states, including in Europe at the local level [18], the World Health 
Organization has initiated a review of the classification of cannabis under the drug conventions [19].  
Within such a fluid, and uncertain, environment, and with due regard for international law, it seems 
as if a temporary period of what might be called respectful non-compliance [12] is an appropriate 
way forward.   
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